Redigerer Invasjonen i Normandie (avsnitt)

=== Taktikk ===
De tyske bakkestyrkene i Normandie holdt stand mot de vest-allierte styrkene lengre enn mange forventet. Forsvarerens fordel er én forklaring, en annen at mens mange tyske soldater hadde fire års krigserfaring i 1944 var mange vest-allierte soldater sivilister som opplevde kamp for første gang. I en amerikansk [[bataljon]] (mellom 500–800 mann) kunne det være at bare sjefen, en [[oberst]], var yrkesmilitær. Det tyske Wehrmachts taktikk, såkalt [[oppdragstaktikk]] (tysk: ''Auftragstaktik'') var imidlertid en annen viktig faktor. De enkelte enhetene var trent i å ta initiativ, selv når situasjonen skiftet raskt, og ikke vente på ordre fra høyere hold, noe vest-allierte soldater ofte gjorde. Denne taktikken var basert på tyske erfaringer fra [[første verdenskrig]], særlig med de såkalte [[Stormsoldat (tysk stormtrupper)|stormtroppene]], for gjennombrudd i de fastlåste frontlinjene.<ref>Tamelander/Zetterling 2004, s. 102–112, 272–273</ref><ref group="note">{{Kilde www|url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/tactics-and-the-cost-of-victory-in-normandy|tittel=Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy|besøksdato=7. mai 2024|forlag=[[Imperial War Museums]]|sitat=At times, British formations exhibited more caution than may have been warranted. Troops were often only too ready to 'go to ground' and call in artillery support even when facing fairly limited opposition. They were never as adept at exploiting local successes as the Germans, who excelled at quickly retaking ground. Montgomery himself urged his commanders to exhibit greater drive and flexibility, and some were sacked for failing to do so. Many German troops and commanders fought with a zeal and fanaticism alien to the citizen soldiers of Second Army.}}</ref><ref group="note">{{Kilde www|url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-response-to-d-day|tittel=The German Response to D-Day|besøksdato=7. mai 2024|forlag=Imperial War Museums|sitat=But German troops fought well on D-Day and then kept Allied forces bottled up in their lodgement area for seven weeks. They suffered from shortages of everything, received minimal reinforcements and were utterly exposed to the depredations of Allied air power. Despite all of this, and the dead hand of Hitler reaching from his headquarters on the other side of Europe, they conducted a masterly defence, inflicting heavy losses on their opponents. Much of this was down to the fact that they had chosen the ground, and could benefit from all the defensive advantages that such congested and enclosed terrain offered. Some of it was the result of hesitant or clumsy Allied tactics. The Germans also possessed tanks and weapons that in many ways were superior to those of the Allies. But there is also no doubt that the fighting quality of the German soldier himself, whether motivated by fanaticism, discipline or fear, was a significant factor. The campaign in Normandy was the greatest military defeat yet suffered by the German armed forces, but it was also an exposition of German fighting power.}}</ref>